

UCRP CBC Voter Information Guide

Bylaw Change B-128-B SCC Elected at SCC Caucus

Constitution & Bylaws Committee – No Recommendation – Adoption-2, Rejection-2

Executive Committee Recommends Rejection (Adoption-2, Rejection-20)

Purpose

This proposal allows the county party to create its own districts, called "SCC Districts" (meaning State Central Committee Districts), such that the influence of one district when compared with another--as measured by votes per seat--is nearly the same.

Preliminary calculations indicate that the weakest SCC District would have 25497 votes per seat, and the strongest would have 24145 votes per seat, or a 1352 vote per seat variance among all 20 districts.

The 2009 Organizing Convention was attended by approximately 850 delegates. There, 50 candidates ran for 20 seats. If this same field of candidates ran in 20 different districts, then there would be, on average, two or three candidates per SCC District race, whose election would be determined by 40 to 45 delegates.

(Changes in **bold**, additions are underlined, removed text is ~~in strikethrough~~)

Bylaw 3 B 2

B. 2 The remaining number of State Central Committee members allocated to represent Utah County on the State Central Committee shall be elected by the delegates to the Utah County Republican Party Organizing Convention ~~in the same manner as other county party positions are elected at said convention~~ **assembled in SCC District Caucuses, one SCC member per district. Each SCC District Caucus will be made up of the convention delegates residing in a contiguous cluster of voting precincts, in the same community if possible, and be comprised such that the relative republican strength of each SCC District is approximately equal. The Executive Committee will approve a list of SCC Districts at least 30 days prior to the Organizing Convention. Each SCC member will represent and report to his respective SCC District.**

C. Vacancies. Vacancies arising from death, resignation, or other cause, shall be filled by the next highest eligible vote recipient from the list of candidates who ran for a seat on the State Central Committee at the previous ~~County Organizing Convention~~ **SCC District Caucus**. In the case of a tie, [continues unchanged]

Arguments FOR

This proposal is a logical extension of B-128-A. In other words, this one grew out of that one--for two reasons, mainly.

Example A: Suppose we have six seats to allocate among three districts whose relative republican strength is 1000, 2000, and 3000, respectively. That's easy: the first district gets one seat, the second! district gets two seats, and the third district gets three seats. Thus, each seat is worth 1000 votes, or 1000 votes per seat (vps).

Example B: Next suppose we have seven seats to allocate among these three districts. Allocating the first six seats is easy. But which district should get the seventh seat? If it goes to the first district, members in that district would have 500 vps; if it goes to the second district, members of that district would have 667 vps; and if it goes to the third district, members in that district would have 750 vps. Obviously, the lower the number of votes per seat, the more influence is held by members in that district. Logic and reason suggest that the seat should go to the third district so that the votes per seat (again, a measurement of influence) is most evenly distributed among all districts in the county.

Pursuant to the census taken last year, legislative district boundaries will be changed some time this year. Until then, we will not be able conclusively to calculate votes per seat in each of the senate districts. But using the current senate districts, and allocating 20 seats among them, the influence held by each senate district, as measured by votes per seat, would be as follows:

SD #, votes, seats, vps
SD 11, 66062, 3, 22021
SD 13, 160322, 6, 26720
SD 14, 77809, 3, 25936
SD 15, 87510, 3, 29170 (least influence)
SD 16, 60532, 3, 20177
SD 27, 39501, 2, 19751 (most influence)

This 9419 vote per seat disparity (the difference between 29170 and 19751) between SD 15 and SD 27 was unsettling, and was (as mentioned earlier) the second reason for the formulation of this proposal.

Other reasons to support this proposal are essentially the same as the reasons to support of B-128-A, so repeating them here is unnecessary.

Arguments AGAINST

This proposal to create 20 equal State Central Committee districts sounds great in theory, with laudable intent, but would present an administrative nightmare.

We have just seen the havoc created by boundary problems in District 57 – and that was done by professionals with a full paid staff. Why would we amateurs want to get into the controversial district-mapping business?

Who would be saddled with the huge task of drawing up the maps of 20 SCC Districts? Each one would need to include voting precincts in the same community, if possible, so that the relative Republican strength of each SCC District is approximately equal.

There would be at least 100, and probably more like 1,000, different ways of drawing up the list of SCC Districts. And no matter which of those alternatives was chosen it would be virtually guaranteed that at least one group, and probably several groups, of people would object to the way the District boundaries were drawn. These disagreements would result in lengthy delays at the Organizing Convention before a vote could be taken, and may even lead to lawsuits challenging the list of SCC Districts.

And even if the hurdle of District boundary disputes could finally be surmounted, Convention leaders would have to find room for, and oversee elections in, 20 different caucuses. Getting each of the nearly 1,000 Convention delegates to the right rooms is more complicated than we have ever experienced at an Organizing Convention.